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ABSTRACT
In this article, we examine the relationship between presidential patronage and federal
agency performance. Using Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) management scores
for 1,016 federal programs during the Bush Administration, we compare the performance of
federal programs administered by appointees from the campaign or party against programs
run by other appointees or career professionals. We introduce new means of overcoming
the shortcomings of PART scores in order to make reliable inferences from this measure of
federal program performance. We find that federal programs administered by appointees
from the campaign or party earn lower PART scores than programs run by other appointees
or by career executives. We conclude that although appointing persons from the campaign
or party provides presidents an important source of political capital and arguably improves
accountability, it also has costs for agency performance.
When presidents reward campaign staff or political supporters with federal jobs does this
hurt management performance? From very early in President Obama’s tenure, critics have
charged that appointments to some key positions as close as the White House and as far
away as ambassadorships were made more for political or campaign support than
demonstrated competence (Nakamura 2009; Weisman and Hayashi 2009). President Ob-
ama, like presidents before him, appears to be using some plum jobs to reward supporters
and the politically connected. President Bush was similarly criticized for his appointments
of persons like Michael Brown (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA]), Julie
Myers (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), and David Safavian (Ofﬁce of Federal
Procurement Policy) to key jobs in the administration despite scant credentials (Eggen and
Hsu 2005; Smith and Schmidt 2005; Tumulty, Thompson, and Allen 2005). Yet, presidents
generally defend these appointments as appropriate, arguing that they conform to historical
norms, have a general (though not speciﬁc) competence, and that their proximity to the
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president can compensate for a lack of credentials.1 For example, the White House recently
defended the appointment of John Roos as Ambassador to Japan, arguing that President
Obama had always said some ambassadorial picks would be political, that Roos would
work closely with the President, and that he was very accomplished. The White
House did not make any reference to expertise in Japanese history, culture, or politics
or knowledge of the important foreign policy questions facing the region.
Cases like these raise the important question of what impact campaign or political
supporters have on performance when they receive political appointments. Congress
and the press severely criticized Brown for his role in FEMA’s ﬂawed response to
Hurricane Katrina and provided further evidence that the skills necessary to win campaigns
are distinct from those required to govern. Yet, presidents frequently maintain that what
some appointees lack in demonstrated credentials, they make up for in general competence
and a close connection to the president. Indeed, the connections and experience that come
with work for the campaign or party may provide executives precisely what is needed for
them to do their job well. An important component of agency leadership is political work
such as strategic planning, policy making, and building relationships with key stakeholders
(Maranto 2008). It is also possible that appointees with few credentials are appointed to
precisely those jobs where very little speciﬁc expertise is required (Lewis 2009). In am-
bassadorships, for example, it is often career deputies who do most of the serious foreign
policy work.
In this article, we examine the relationship between appointees chosen for campaign
or political experience and federal management performance. Using 1,016 Program
Assessment Rating Tool (PART) scores—numerical measures of federal program perfor-
mance used during the Bush Administration—we compare the performance of federal pro-
grams administered by appointees from the campaign or party against programs run by
other appointed or career executives. We introduce new ways of accounting for shortcom-
ings in the PART scores themselves in order to make reliable inferences from this measure
of federal program performance. We ﬁnd that federal programs administered by appointees
from the campaign earn the lowest PART scores, followed by programs directed by other
appointees, and programs administered by career professionals. We conclude that although
choosing appointees from the campaign or party has important political beneﬁts for parties
and presidents, its persistence in American democracy also has deleterious consequences
for federal management performance.
PATRONAGE, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS, AND MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE
A number of excellent works describe the different factors that explain presidential appoint-
ment decisions such as loyalty, competence, and patronage but also sociodemographic
characteristics, geography, relations with Congress, and interest group lobbying (see,
e.g., Heclo 1977; Light 1995; Mackenzie 1981). Recent work has particularly emphasized
loyalty and, to a lesser extent, competence as the key factors in presidential selection
(Edwards 2001; Moe 1985; Weko 1995). This increased presidential control of the process
1 In fact, some argue that wealth can improve ambassadorial performance since many embassies are underfunded
(Maranto 2005, 110-11).
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and focus on loyalty and competence has been aided by a professionalization of the White
House personnel operation (Pﬁffner 1996; Patterson and Pﬁffner 2001; Weko 1995). Gen-
erally, however, for most appointments, a host of factors are considered and weighed to-
gether prior to selection. Where appointments can be distinguished is in the weight
presidents assign different factors. For a class of appointments, much greater weight is
placed on political factors than experience or expertise and these appointees are the focus
of attention here.
Although it is generally acknowledged that presidents reward campaign and party staff
with jobs as a reward for pastwork and to induce future support, no large-N studies attempt to
evaluate the inﬂuence of this practice on management performance (Bearﬁeld 2009; Mack-
enzie 1981). A number of recent studies focus on the inﬂuence of appointees onmanagement
performance relative to career professionals. These works describe the differences between
appointees and careerists thatmatter for performance. Speciﬁcally, Collins et al. (2006),Gil-
mour and Lewis (2006), and Lewis (2008) ﬁnd that programs and agencies administered by
appointeesperformsystematicallyworse thanthoserunbycareerprofessionals.Lewis (2008)
ﬁnds that career professionals havemore direct agency experience and longer tenures on av-
erage and both of these factors lead to bettermanagement performance.Appointedmanagers
are more likely to have higher education levels and more nongovernment management ex-
perience,but these factorshadno inﬂuenceonprogramperformance.Yet, fewdirect attempts
havebeenmade todeterminewhether appointees selectedprimarily for campaignexperience
or connections actually do adversely inﬂuence performance.
One obstacle to this line of research is that it is very difﬁcult for scholars to measure
US government performance systematically across different contexts. A number of studies
have used revenue forecasts (Krause and Douglas 2005, 2006; Krause, Lewis, and Douglas
2006) or responses to employee surveys to measure agency performance (e.g., Brewer and
Selden 2000; Choi and Rainey 2010; Chun and Rainey 2005; Oh and Lewis 2008). Others
have used PART scores as a measure of management performance (e.g., Gilmour and
Lewis 2006; Jung and Rainey 2008, 2009; Lewis 2008). Each of these measures has
limitations. Speciﬁcally, it is unclear whether budget forecasting agencies are like other
agencies and whether results from those studies are generalizable to other agencies.
Surveys of federal employees rely on the impressions of federal employees who may
or may not be close enough to agency senior leaders to accurately evaluate performance.
PART scores were generated by a presidential agency, applied unevenly across agencies,
and there is evidence that some programs received higher scores simply because some ex-
ecutives were better at the PART process (see, e.g., Gilmour 2006; Metzenbaum 2009;
Moynihan 2006, 2008; Posner and Fantone 2007; Radin 2005; US Government
Accountability Ofﬁce 2004, 2005, 2008). It was also difﬁcult to identify the precise ofﬁcial
responsible for program performance (Moynihan 2009). These difﬁculties can create
problems for inference.
Recently, new data have emerged to mitigate some of the shortcomings of the
PART scores. Speciﬁcally, Bertelli et al. (2008) ﬁelded a conﬁdential survey of 7,448
career and appointed executives across the executive branch in 2007–08 that included ques-
tions about the PART process. The survey asked career executives involved in the PART
process the extent to which PART scores picked up real differences among programs in
their agency. If career professionals in the agencies who are most familiar with the pro-
grams and the PART scores believe that the PART scores measure real differences in
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program performance, this should give us conﬁdence in using these measures to evaluate
comparative management performance. Parsing out only those programs whose PART
scores are considered valid by those most knowledgeable should provide and important
robustness check on any analyses using PART scores as a measure of performance.
THE PATRONAGE-PERFORMANCE LINK
Existing research has identiﬁed two pathways by which appointees systematically inﬂuence
agency performance relative to career managers. The ﬁrst pathway is through differences in
backgroundand trainingbetween these twoclassesof federal executives.Appointedandcareer
managers have different backgrounds and qualiﬁcations (see, e.g., Aberbach and Rockman
2000; Lewis 2008; Maranto 2005). Appointees average fewer years of public management
experience. They are less likely to have worked in the agency they manage before being se-
lected to lead it, and they have fewer years of federal government experience overall. The
informational asymmetries between appointed managers and subordinates are greater than
forcareeristmanagersandtheir subordinates.These factors inﬂuence theabilityofappointees
to monitor the programs they direct and implement policies they prefer.
Appointees do have the advantage of political connections. They have signiﬁcantlymore
political experience and often have a closer connection to political stakeholders than career
managers. Their political connections may be parlayed into greater resources for the agency.
Appointedexecutives also average slightlymoreeducationandhave signiﬁcantlymoreprivate
ornot-for-proﬁtsectormanagementexperiencealthoughit isunclearhoweasilyhigherlevelsof
education or generalmanagement experience translate into improvedagencyperformancedue
to important differences between managing in the private and public sector.
The second pathway by which appointee management inﬂuences performance is
through systematic effects on the agency personnel system. Even if the population of
appointee managers and career managers is of comparable experience and background,
appointee management can have deleterious consequences for agency performance (Lewis
2008). Appointees stay for shorter tenures than career managers (Heclo 1977). This creates
greater management turnover and vacancies in programs and agencies run by appointees.
Regular turnover makes it difﬁcult for the agency to communicate agency goals, credibly
commit to reform, monitor agency activity, and generally poorer performance (Boylan
2004; Heclo 1977; Lewis 2008; O’Connell 2009). Agencies with appointee managers also
have a hard time recruiting and retaining top quality career professionals (Gailmard and
Patty 2007). When careerists do not have access to the highest paying or most inﬂuential
positions in agencies, they have less of an incentive to stay or invest the time and effort they
would otherwise expend in pursuit of those positions. Careerists see less qualiﬁed but
politically connected persons taking the top jobs in their agency, and this is harmful
for morale. Appointee management inﬂuences not only the qualiﬁcations and performance
of program managers but also the qualiﬁcations and motivation of career professionals that
work below these program managers.
Appointees from the Campaign or Party versus Other Appointees
The discussion of differences between programs administered by appointees versus those
run by careerists does not directly speak to differences among types of appointees, but its
implications are clear. The sources of the appointee-careerist gap in performance are even
more pronounced for appointees selected from the campaign or party. Since these
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appointees are selected importantly due to campaign or political experience, the chance that
they are selected for demonstrated competence is lower and the skills necessary for man-
aging a campaign differ from those required for governing. This is not to say that all ex-
ecutives from the campaign or party will perform worse than their other appointee
colleagues. Indeed, many executives with campaign and party experience are skilled man-
agers. Rather, the chance that patronage appointees have demonstrated expertise or cre-
dentials is lower. To the extent that demonstrated credentials or previous experience or
expertise are related to agency performance, programs run by patronage appointees should
perform worse than programs run by other appointees or careerists.
Patronage appointees are also likely to turn over more quickly than other appointees.
Since patronage appointees are drawn from the political world, they are also more likely
to make career decisions with a future career in mind. Rather than view a political appoint-
ment as a capstone to a long career, patronage appointees tend to be younger and seeking
other jobs in the party, a future administration, or with a ﬁrm or group with a close connection
to the president’s party. This leads to shorter tenures on average. Agencies that are regularly
on the receiving end of patronage appointments have higher turnover and vacancy rates.
Since patronage appointees are likely to have fewer qualiﬁcations than other
appointees, the effects of their selection on executive career choices are more pronounced.
Some agencies are fortunate enough to be administered by a string of very talented
appointed managers. Others like FEMA are less fortunate, receiving third and fourth
tier political types consistently (Lewis 2008, 150). For example, in the aftermath of Pres-
ident George W. Bush’s initial appointment of Joseph Allbaugh to FEMA, one career man-
ager said, ‘‘There are plenty of Republican emergency managers, ﬁre chiefs, or police
chiefs around. And they pull this guy who’s a campaign manager?’’ (Klinenberg and Frank
2005). A large number of experienced career professionals left FEMA during the ﬁrst 2
years of the Bush Administration. Although the increasing penetration of appointees into
agency management can have deleterious consequences for efforts to recruit and retain
career professionals, this effect is even more dramatic when those appointees selected
are noticeably less qualiﬁed than career professionals who otherwise would hold those jobs.
In total, appointees who obtain jobs through work for the campaign or party should be
less qualiﬁed than other appointees and careerists. They should stay for shorter tenures and
programs they run should perform systematically worse than other programs.
DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHODS
To evaluate the relationship between patronage appointees and performance, we use PART
scores, a performance measurement scheme devised by the Ofﬁce of Management and
Budget (OMB) during the George W. Bush Administration. Under the PART system, bud-
get examiners in the OMB in cooperation with agency ofﬁcials graded almost all federal
programs (98%) one time over a 7-year period between 2002 and 2008. OMB worked with
agencies and gave grades from 0 to 100 for different aspects of program performance based
upon a series of 25–30 yes/no questions. Answers to the questions provide the basis for
numerical scores in four categories of performance (program purpose and design, strategic
planning, program management, and program results), a weighted total score, and an
overall program evaluation (ineffective, results not demonstrated, adequate, moderately
effective, effective). The questions and the grading scheme were devised through the Fed-
eral Advisory Commission Act process and with the input of numerous parties including the
National Academy of Public Administration, Congress, and other interested parties. In
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total, between 2002 and 2008, 1,016 federal programs were graded. The average total grade
was 66.92 (18.34 standard deviation [SD]; minimum 10; maximum 100), and the ratings
percentages were ineffective (2.56%), results not demonstrated (17.03%), adequate
(29.33), moderately effective (32.09%), and effective (19.00%).
To determine whether programs were administered by appointees or careerists, we
relied on the PART worksheets.2 These worksheets list both the agency and the bureau
that house each program. We consider the head of the bureau as the person responsible
for the program unless the program itself is an agency or is obviously part of a speciﬁc
subagency.3 To determine whether the person was an appointee (either Senate-conﬁrmed
or in the Senior Executive Service) or a careerist, we relied on information from the Federal
Yellow Book.4 In total, we could ﬁnd biographical information about managers of 977 of the
1,016 federal programs. Of these 977 federal programs, 8.80% (86) were managed by
career executives (Career appointment), 11.26% (110) by politically appointed members
of the Senior Executive Service (Noncareer appointment), and 79.43% (776) by Senate-
conﬁrmed appointees (Presidential appointment with Senate conﬁrmation). There are also
ﬁve programs administered by personnel from agencies with their own personnel system,
making it difﬁcult to classify them as either career professionals or political appointees.5
For many programs, the easiest ofﬁcial to identify was a cabinet secretary, either because
a bureau was not listed or a program cut across several bureaus. It is unlikely that the
secretary was directly involved in the day-to-day operations of these programs, so we also
evaluate the data below without these cases as a robustness check.
There were 358 different managers of the 977 programs.6 We collected background in-
formation on each of the 358 managers from a variety of sources including data from Lewis
(2008), publicly available biographies, and the Federal Yellow Book.7 Among the data we
2 For an example, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10002014.2004.html (accessed August 3,
2010). For the complete data, see http://www.expectmore.gov.
3 For example, the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) is part of the Power Marketing Administration in
the Department of Energy.WAPAwas considered to be a program for evaluation by the OMB. Rather than consider the
head of the Power Marketing Administration as the agency head, we considered the head of WAPA itself as the head.
Similarly, if a program involved Native American health but the worksheet only listed the program as being part of the
Department of Health and Human Services, we considered the head of the Indian Health Service as the program
manager. In some cases, the worksheet lists no bureau. It either leaves that entry blank or it lists the agency name again.
In these cases, we list the agency head as the programmanager. We have also estimated models excluding cases where
no bureau is listed and the results look similar to what is reported here. The results are included in Appendix 1.
4 The Federal Yellow Book is published by Leadership Directories, Inc. It lists contact information for agency
ofﬁcials, their appointment authority, and often biographical information. We assume that all persons are careerists
unless otherwise indicated by the Yellow Book.
5 There were two managers overseeing ﬁve programs. We exclude these two managers and ﬁve cases from the main
analyses. In general, programs administered by these two managers from agencies with their own personnel system
performed poorly. Their total PART score was 52.27.We have also estimatedmodels simply controlling for these cases
and the estimates are virtually identical to what is reported here. The coefﬁcient on these cases is large and negative, as
expected. We exclude them here because we do not have enough cases to make reliable inferences about programs in
agencies with their own personnel systems. The results are available from the authors upon request.
6 The SD for total PART scores overall is 18.34. The average SD for PART scores by manager is 6.47. This suggests
that, although there is variance in program PART scores within manager, it is smaller than the overall SD. This implies
that managers that direct programs with high scores are less likely to direct programs with very low scores. Managers
that direct programs with very low scores are unlikely to also direct programs with very high scores. Since each
program in the data set has been evaluated once, there are no cases where a program has been managed both by an
appointee and careerist.
7 Lewis data available at http://people.vanderbilt.edu/;david.lewis/data.htm.
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collectedwas information about the campaign experience of themanager, includingwhether
or not the manager worked for the campaign (5.08%) or previously worked for the party
(3.49%).8TheYellowBook lists8managersof57programsashavingworkedonthecampaign
staffand16managersoverseeing84programsashavingworkedeither for thecampaignor the
national party prior to their appointment. As the descriptive statistics suggest, the number of
managers whose publicly available biographical information mentioned work on the cam-
paign is limited. However, a signiﬁcantly larger number of managers in the administration
were associated in somewaywith the campaign. As a robustness check below, we also eval-
uate the data by subdividing the data into appointees with any public connection to the cam-
paign and appointees with no public connection to the campaign (18.50%).9
As a starting point, Table 1 lists differences in background characteristics among
appointees from the campaign, appointees not from the campaign, and careerists. Indicators
are included to identify statistically distinguishable differences between (1) appointees who
did not work on the campaign and careerists and (2) appointees from the campaign
and appointees not from the campaign. Important differences are apparent among the
three groups. Appointees from the campaign have systematically less education and
more political experience than either career professionals or other appointees. Like other
appointees, they have less agency experience, shorter tenures, and more private sector man-
agement experience than career professionals. They manage fewer employees but a greater
number of programs than other types of managers which suggests they manage a greater
number of smaller programs.
The differences between appointees from the campaign, other appointees, and career
executives appear to matter for performance. Figure 1 includes histograms of total PART
scores by type of program manager. The ﬁgure illustrates what is suggested in the bottom
rowsof table 1.Programsadministeredbyappointees from thecampaignhave systematically
lower part scores (55) than other appointees (69) and career professionals (73). This ﬁrst cut
at the PART score data suggests that the naming of appointees from the campaign to admin-
ister federal programs and agencies hurts program performance. The skills these appointees
exercised working on the campaign do not directly translate into program management.
Controls for Agency and Program Characteristics
Of course, these observed differences in PART scores may be due to factors other than the
quality of the managers. To account for this, we estimate a series of models that control for
a host of agency, program, and year-speciﬁc factors that may inﬂuence a program’s PART
score and be correlated with whether or not the programmanager is a career professional or
appointee of some type. One difﬁculty with comparing program performance across a wide
variety of programs is that programs differ dramatically in what they do and their size.
8 Many other members of the paid campaign staff were rewarded with jobs in the administration but fewwere directly
placed into jobs as agency heads or programmanagers. We include an indicator for campaign experience (0,1) in some
models and an indicator for campaign or party experience (0,1) in what follows. We prefer the latter measure since it
includes a greater number of managers.
9 To construct this measure, we searched for any reported connection to the campaign in newspapers across the
country. We conducted a Lexis-Nexis search of the manager’s name within a limited number of words to ‘‘Bush’’ and
‘‘campaign,’’ ‘‘rally,’’ ‘‘introduced,’’ ‘‘advisor,’’ or ‘‘adviser’’ and read through all relevant articles. In all cases where
an article indicated a connection between the person and the campaign we coded them with a 1. All other managers
were coded with a 0.
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Some programs regulate (e.g., food safety, pest and disease management), others provide
credit (e.g., small business development, veterans home loans), and others deliver direct
services to clients (e.g., Head Start, Smithsonian operations). To account for these differ-
ences and compare different types of programs against each other, we include indicators for
each program type—block/formula grant (15.9%), capital assets and service acquisition
(8.4%), competitive grant (17.4%), credit (3.8%), direct federal (36.1%), research and de-
velopment (11.1%), and regulatory (7.3%) programs.10 The models also control for the
natural log of program budget since larger programs may be harder (or easier) to manage
and the size of programs differs by type of manager.
Important contextual differences exist among agencies that implement federal programs
that may also inﬂuence PART scores, including structural features such as the presence of
ﬁxed terms (4.8%) and whether an agency is a commission (7.4%) or administration.11
Table 1







Education (0–3) 2.07 1.67# 2.16
Previous bureau experience (0,1) 0.85 0.50 0.50*
Experience in another federal department (0,1) 0.45 0.50 0.42
Public management experience (0,1) 0.98 1.00 0.92#
Private sector management experience (0,1) 0.26 0.50 0.56*
Tenure as bureau chief (Years) 3.65 2.03 2.36*
Worked in Congress (0,1) 0.00 0.20 0.15*
Worked in the White House (0,1) 0.00 0.30* 0.06*
Management Environment
Programs graded (1–3) 1.17 3.65* 1.73*
Average budget of program graded (millions) $520 $959 $4899
Bureau employment (10–222,715) 7,191 856 13,788
Number of Appointees in Agency 2.4 5.1 10.2*
PART Score
Program Purpose and Design 88.19 79.53* 87.59
Strategic Planning 79.61 62.40* 78.89
Program Management 88.80 79.02 84.09*
Program Results 59.50 34.73* 52.92*
Average Total PART grade (0–100) 73.07 55.24* 68.63*
Note: N 5 351. Education levels (1–4) are bachelors or lower, masters, MD or DDM, and doctorate. There are only 8 managers who
came from the campaign and they manage 57 programs. Previous bureau experience indicates work for the bureau prior to becoming its
head. For difference of means tests, the ‘‘Other Appointee’’ is column compared to ‘‘Careerist’’ column and the ‘‘Appointee from the
Campaign’’ column compared to Other Appointee column.
*Difference in means signiﬁcant at the .05 level in one-tailed tests; #Difference in means signiﬁcant at the .10 level in one-tailed tests.
10 These program categories are the primary classiﬁcations for each program. Some programs are listed as more than
type. There was one program whose type was listed as ‘‘mixed.’’ This program was excluded.
11 We have also estimated models that include indicators for the cabinet departments. In these models, the coefﬁcient
on work for the campaign or party is negative but smaller and only marginally signiﬁcant in two-tailed tests (p, .11).
The coefﬁcients are still substantively notable (24 to 26 points on the total PART score). The results suggest that
cabinet departments that house programmanagers that worked on the campaign also house programs that are managed
poorly. Is it the department culture that contributes to poor program performance or the patronage appointees that
contribute to this culture that lead to poor program performance? The model estimates suggest both. These results are
included in Appendix 1.
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Agencies with these features are designed to be insulated from presidential control and this
can inﬂuence the difﬁculty or ease of management. Some bureaus manage a greater number
of programs than others. This can inﬂuence program performance and varies by type of
manager. To account for this, we include a control for the number of programs an agency
or bureau has evaluated in the year the program is being evaluated (mean 3.5; SD 3.47;
minimum 1; maximum 31).
The policy content of what agencies do can also inﬂuence the evaluation of speciﬁc
programs. Some agencies, by virtue of mission, history, and personnel, are more liberal or
conservative than others. If PART scores are politicized, these differences in agency ideol-
ogy will inﬂuence the grades programs receive. To measure the ideology of agencies, we
use preference estimates created by Clinton and Lewis (2008). Clinton and Lewis
conducted an expert survey about whether agencies tended to be liberal, conservative,
or neither consistently and used responses to generate estimates, adjusting for different
Figure 1
Total PART Score by Manager Type
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deﬁnitions of liberal and conservative and the quality of the ratings. Some prominent liberal
agencies include the Departments of Education, Housing and Urban Development, and
Labor. Prominent conservative agencies include Treasury and Defense and notable mod-
erate agencies include the departments of Agriculture and State. Since PART scores are
generated by a Republican Administration, programs in liberal agencies will get system-
atically lower grades if the grades are politicized.
Finally, we include indicators for year a program was assessed since the average
PART score may increase over time as agency ofﬁcials become familiar with the system
and more or fewer patronage appointees may serve as the president’s tenure progresses.
Methods
We estimate a series of regressions where the unit of analysis is a federal program,12 the
dependent variable is the total PART score,13 the key independent variable is the type of
manager (careerist, appointee from campaign, other appointee), and the models include
a series of agency and program-speciﬁc controls. Since bureau chiefs often manage mul-
tiple programs and bureaus house multiple programs, we report robust standard errors.14
One criticism of the PART scores is that they have very little connection to real per-
formance. To help address these concerns, we use data from a recent survey of federal
executives that asked the executives themselves about the validity of the PART scores
for programs in their agency. In 2007–08, the Survey on the Future of Government Service
asked career professionals involved in the PART process the following question,
To what extent did the PART pick up real differences in program performance among
programs in your agency? [Almost always reﬂected real differences (2.62%), generally
reﬂected real differences (14.94%), sometimes reﬂected real differences (26.58%), rarely
reﬂected real differences (22.70%), PART scores have no connection to real performance
(14.18%), don’t know (18.99%)].
What is notable about the response to this question is the low percentage overall that
believed PART scores measured real differences across programs in their agencies. This
gives credence to concerns articulated about these scores and their use in the budgetary
process (Gilmour 2006; Metzenbaum 2009; Moynihan 2006, 2008; Posner and Fantone
2007; Radin 2005; US Government Accountability Ofﬁce 2004, 2005, 2008).
Although the PART scores were less discriminating in some agencies, they were
adjudged to pick up real differences in other agencies. This provides a useful means of
12 We have also estimated models where the manager is the unit of analysis and discuss these below. Since programs
are embedded in agencies accounting for the hierarchical structure in the data would be natural. The difﬁculty with
estimating such models in this case is that it is very demanding on the data to estimate an intercept and slope for each
agency. Given that there are only 16 managers who were afﬁliated with the campaign, there are only 1 or 2 such
appointees at most in any given agency. Estimating coefﬁcients on the patronage variable by agency with 1 or 2 cases is
infeasible. We have, however, estimated hierarchical linear models to test for the inﬂuence of appointees generally on
program performance (excluding the patronage variable). The average estimated effect of appointees on PART score is
sizeable and signiﬁcant (B 5 24.73 and SE 5 2.07) and conﬁrms what is reported in the text.
13 We have also estimated models using the overall categorical grade for each program. These models look similar to
those in table 2 and are included in Appendix 1.
14 We have also estimatedmodels where SEs are adjusted for clustering on bureau or manager. Thesemodels conﬁrm
what is reported here. There are a few outlier cases that may be inﬂuential according to leverage plots (lvr2plot in
STATA 10.0). We have also estimated models excluding these cases and the results conﬁrm what is reported here.
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gleaning only the best information from the PART scores. The tables below include col-
umns for models estimated on all PART scores and models estimated on a subset of models
using only the most reliable PART scores according to career professionals. Speciﬁcally,
we estimate models on the subset of agencies where more than half report that PART
scores, almost always, generally, or sometimes reﬂect real differences among programs
in their agencies.15 If the relationship between manager type and performance remain even
in the subset of most reliable PART scores, this provides additional conﬁdence that the
relationship is not an artifact of some component of the PART scores themselves.
There are two other notable difﬁculties inmodel estimation. First, whether or not a pro-
gram is administered by a careerist, an appointee, or an appointee from the campaign may
be endogenous. For example, it could be that appointees from the campaign are selected to
run the most difﬁcult and politically sensitive programs. If this is the case, the low PART
scores we see in ﬁgure 1 for appointee-run programs may be due to the difﬁculty running
the program and not the management ability of the appointee. Of course, the evidence in
table 1 suggests that appointees from the campaign or party have fewer credentials than
other appointees so it would be somewhat surprising if such persons were selected to run the
most challenging programs. All models try to control for relevant aspects of the manage-
ment environment such as program size and type of program. We have also estimated
models on a subset of the data where the appointment authority of the manager is estimated
along with the total PART score via two-stage least squares. In these models, we could not
reject the null that the ordinary least-squares (OLS) coefﬁcients were the same as those in
the instrumental variables regressions (p , .82). We focus on the OLS estimates here and
include the two-stage least-squares estimates in Appendix 1.16
A second potential difﬁculty would emerge if presidents wanted certain programs to
fail, particularly programs that the president opposed. If this were the case, a correlation
might exist between some appointees and low PART scores not because of poor manage-
ment but because presidents appointed these managers to hurt these programs. We have
estimated models on liberal and conservative agencies separately to see whether the re-
lationship between manager type and PART score remains. If the Republican president
wanted programs to fail, this should be most apparent for programs in liberal agencies
(e.g., regulatory and social welfare programs). Model estimates look generally similar
for liberal and conservative agencies, however, suggesting that the difference in PART
scores among manager types is not inﬂuenced by systematic presidential attempts to make
programs fail.17
RESULTS
Table 2 includesestimates fromfourmodelsofPARTscores.Models1and2areestimatedon
all PART scores, and Models 3 and 4 are estimated using only on the most reliable PART
scores according to career professionals.Model 5 includes estimates from amodelwhere the
15 We have also used different cutoffs (i.e., agencies where two-third or three-fourth of careerists have these
responses) and the bivariate patterns remain (p, .00 for two-third cutoff; p, .08 for three-fourth cutoff). More fully
speciﬁed models are difﬁcult to estimate since reducing the number of cases also reduces the number of managers with
previous campaign or political experience.
16 Details of the estimation are included in Appendix 2.
17 These estimates are included in Appendix 1.
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manager is the unit of analysis and themanager’s average PART score is the dependent vari-
able. These models are estimated to determine whether the relationship between manager
type (careerist, appointee from the campaign, other appointee) and PART score so visible
in ﬁgure 1 is real or the result of other intervening variables. In general, the estimates conﬁrm
the basic result. Federal programs administered by appointees from the campaign earn the
lowest PART scores. Programs directed by other appointees earn the next lowest evaluations
and programs administered by career professionals earn the highest PART scores. This gen-
eral pattern is robust even when the analysis is limited to the PART scores that career pro-
fessionals have identiﬁed as reliably differentiating programs on true performance.
Substantively, programs administered by appointees are estimated to earn PART
scores from 4.69 (Model 2) to 6.74 (Model 3) points lower than other programs. The size
of this effect is consistent with what has been reported in other work (Lewis 2008) and
provides additional evidence that appointee management has costs as well as beneﬁts.
Although appointee management may be useful for improving accountability and advanc-
ing the president’s agenda, these results suggest appointee management also has systematic
harmful effects on program performance on average. The differences in performance may
stem from differences in the qualiﬁcations of appointees versus careerists or the long-term
effects appointee penetration has on executive turnover, incentives to invest in expertise,
and efforts to recruit and retain career professionals.
When appointees have backgrounds that include work for the campaign or for the
national party, the difference in PART scores is even more dramatic. Federal programs
managed by campaign or party appointees are estimated to earn PART scores between
9.10 and 13.47 points lower than programs administered by other appointees, depending
upon the model and the measure of campaign work included in the speciﬁcation.18
Programs administered by career professionals are estimated to receive PART scores close
to 1 SD higher than programs administered by appointees with campaign or party expe-
rience. On its face, this is important evidence that some of the observed harmful effects of
appointee management are due to the types of persons appointed. Appointees selected more
for campaign/party experience than competence perform worse than other appointees and
career managers.
The differences in PART scores by manager type remain even when controlling for
a host of agency and program-speciﬁc characteristics. Several controls have notable effects
on PART scores. Programswith a larger budget receive higher PART scores. A 1% increase
in a program’s budget is estimated to increase a program’s PART score by about 1.2–1.3
points in the models including all PART scores (Models 1 and 2) and 0.65–0.73 in the
models estimated on only the most reliable scores (Models 3 and 4). This may be due
to the fact that budget increases may allay one cause of program problems—underfunding.
Some differences among program types appear to systematically inﬂuence PART scores.
Block/formula grants are estimated to get systematically lower PART scores while research
and development programs higher scores relative to regulatory programs (base category).
The former is estimated to earn PART scores that are 5 points lower, whereas the latter is
estimated to earn scores 8 points higher in Models 1 and 2. These effects are smaller and
estimated less precisely in the models using only the most reliable PART scores (Models 3
18 Of course, each of these coefﬁcients is estimated with error, making the true effect possibly smaller or larger. For
the sake of simplicity, however, we will refer to the point estimates.
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Table 2
Federal Program PART Score by Appointees from Campaign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Appointment Authority
Appointee (0,1) 24.96** (1.99) 24.69** (1.99) 26.74** (2.35) 26.60** (2.36) 25.59* (2.99)
Appointee from campaign (0,1) 213.47** (2.61) — 212.26** (2.85) — —
Appointee from campaign or
work with national party (0,1)
— 29.10** (2.02) — 29.18** (2.09) 212.67** (4.73)
Program Characteristics
Ln(Program Budget) 1.20** (0.31) 1.27** (0.31) 0.65* (0.39) 0.73* (0.39) 0.37 (0.61)
Block/Formula Grant (0,1) 25.16* (2.89) 25.18* (2.92) 24.51 (3.59) 24.59 (3.61) 21.47 (5.44)
Capital Assets and Service
Acquisition (0,1)
2.73 (3.07) 3.52 (3.11) 2.95 (4.02) 4.09 (4.07) 3.53 (6.32)
Competitive Grant (0,1) 21.66 (2.68) 21.58 (2.70) 22.99 (3.43) 23.13 (3.44) 2.46 (5.65)
Credit (0,1) 0.76 (3.51) 1.02 (3.56) 1.00 (4.16) 0.75 (4.15) 2.15 (6.02)
Direct Federal (0,1) 1.20 (2.51) 1.49 (2.53) 3.59 (2.97) 3.71 (2.99) 5.63 (4.31)
Research and
Development (0,1)
8.07** (2.67) 8.29** (2.68) 4.45 (3.89) 4.60 (3.91) 10.97* (6.43)
Bureau Characteristics
Fixed Term (0,1) 5.50* (3.07) 4.50 (3.24) 0.09 (4.54) 20.90 (4.70) 2.45 (5.21)
Commission (0,1) 7.23** (2.41) 6.80** (2.49) 5.58 (3.94) 4.97 (4.07) 8.40* (4.34)




1.95** (0.66) 2.40** (0.66) 3.01** (0.90) 3.62** (0.89) 3.84** (1.27)
Constant 57.87** (3.68) 57.57** (3.69) 59.25** (4.95) 58.89** (4.94) 68.26** (5.23)
Only Most Effective
PART Scores?
No No Yes Yes Yes
N 962 962 591 591 208
F(19, 330) 12.09** 10.84** 7.86** 7.60** 3.42**
R2 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.13
Note: Unstandardized regression coefﬁcients and robust SEs reported. Omitted category for appointment authority is career member of the Senior Executive Service. Omitted category for program type is
regulatory programs. Year assessed indicator estimates omitted. Model 5 estimated using managers rather than programs as the unit of analysis.




and 4). The same pattern holds for programs in commissions. Programs in commissions are
estimated to get PART scores that are about 7 points higher than programs in other agencies
when all PART scores are examined, but these effects diminish in the models using only the
subset of PART scores (Models 1 and 2 vs. 3 and 4). Agencies that have had a greater
number of programs evaluated are estimated to do slightly better. This could be a function
of the fact that experience with the PART process improves scores (Gilmour 2006).
The most striking ﬁnding among the controls is that agency ideology is consistently
related to PART scores, with programs in conservative agencies earning signiﬁcantly
higher PART scores than programs in other agencies. A 1 SD increase in the conservatism
of an agency is estimated to increase the average PART score by 2–4 points. More con-
cretely, the estimates suggest that programs in conservative agencies such as the Depart-
ment of the Treasury, the Department of Defense, or the Millennium Challenge
Corporation get PART scores that are 2–4 points higher than programs in the moderate
Department of State or Department of Agriculture and 4–8 points higher than programs
in the liberal Departments of Labor, Education, or Housing and Urban Development. This
implies either that these programs are systematically more effective or that PART scores
are politicized. Disentangling whether the Bush Administration rated conservative pro-
grams highly because conservative programs were more effective or because OMB ofﬁcials
were biased is difﬁcult. This is an issue that could have been revisited in future work had the
Obama Administration maintained the PART system. For example, if liberal programs
were rated more highly in the Obama Administration, this would lend credence to the view
that the PART scores are biased. If conservative programs were still rated more highly in
the Obama Administration, this would be evidence that programs in conservative agencies
were indeed more effective. Unfortunately, the Obama Administration has chosen not to
continue the PART scores and so the analysis can only include data from the Bush Ad-
ministration. Future research may be able to take advantage of performance measurement
efforts at the state level or future administrations to further evaluate whether and when such
schemes are politicized.
Robustness Checks
The preceding analysis of the PART scores reveals that programs administered by appoint-
ees from the campaign or party received the lowest scores. Yet, the models include
programs ostensibly run by a department secretary when these ofﬁcials are unlikely to di-
rect the day-to-day activities of the program. There are also only a limited number of man-
agers from the campaign or party from whom to make inferences. Both problems threaten
the validity of the analysis. To remedy these problems, table 3 includes models that are
estimated on a sample that excludes programs previously assumed to be run by department
secretaries and including a new measure of campaign connections. The models include an
indicator for whether the manager had any public connection to the campaign in newspaper
reports prior to the election (0,1: 18.50%).
The models generally conﬁrm the estimates in table 2. In models with and without
programs ostensibly run by cabinet secretaries programs run by appointees are estimated
to earn lower PART scores. The coefﬁcients are negative and signiﬁcant at the .10 level or
better in all four models. Substantively, appointee-run programs are estimated to earn
scores 3.63 (Model 3) to 6.74 (Model 2) points lower than programs administered by career
professionals. Programs run by appointees with some public connection to the campaign
are estimated to perform worse than programs administered by other appointees. The
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coefﬁcient estimates are negative in all four models but signiﬁcant only in those models
without programs listed as being administered by cabinet secretaries (Models 3 and 4).
Substantively, these models suggest that programs run by appointees afﬁliated with the
campaign earn PART scores 8.14–8.53 points lower than programs run by other appointees.
The new models reconﬁrm that appointees selected partly for campaign work earn lower
PART scores when models are estimated on the most reliable data.
Why Patronage Hurts Management
Why do programs run by appointees from the campaign or party get lower PART scores?
One possible reason is systematic differences in the background or qualiﬁcations of dif-
ferent types of managers. The summary of background characteristics in table 1 revealed
that appointees from the campaign serve shorter tenures, have less education, and more
political experience (i.e., work in the White House or Congress) than other appointees.
Table 4 includes estimates from regressions where PART scores are regressed on the back-
ground characteristics of managers along with agency and program-speciﬁc characteristics.
We code each manager according to whether they have worked in the agency bureau prior
to becoming its head (0,1), how long they have served in their current position as head (2.4:
mean, 0: minimum, 16: maximum), and whether they have had public management expe-
rience (0,1). We also include indicators for masters or doctorate-level education. The mod-
els include indicators for whether the bureau chief has worked outside the bureau in another
federal department (0,1), has private management experience (0,1), and has worked in ei-
ther Congress (0,1) or the White House (0,1). The models in table 4 include the same con-
trols as in tables 2 and 3. Models are estimated, once again, on the full sample of PART
programs and the subset of those deemed most reliable by career professionals.
The results are suggestive with regard to managerial tenure, education, and political
experience. First, the estimates reveal that the longer a manager has been in their position at
the time that a program is evaluated, the higher the PART score. The coefﬁcient estimates
are positive and signiﬁcant at the .10 level or better in both models. Each additional year of
managerial tenure is estimated to increase a program’s PART score by 0.6–0.7 points.19
One explanation for this ﬁnding is that programs experiencing more frequent executive
turnover perform worse. Programs run by appointees from the campaign may earn lower
PART scores because these appointees serve shorter tenures on average. This ﬁnding is
consistent with previous work demonstrating that executive turnover generated poorer per-
formance (Boylan 2004, Lewis 2008).
Of course, another explanation is that poor performance generates short tenures rather
than the other way around. More generally, it is possible that the same factors that lead
programs to have low PART scores also determine whether managers have long or short
tenures. To account for the possibility that tenure is endogenous, we estimated a simple
instrumental variables regression.20 The results were substantively similar and we could not
19 We have also estimated models allowing for different functional forms for the relationship between tenure and
PART score and could not reject the null of a linear relationship.
20 For these models to be identiﬁed, exogenous regressors must be identiﬁed. In this case we employ two exogenous
regressors, the year of the manager’s hire and the year the program was assessed. Both regressors predict managerial
tenure but should not inﬂuence PART score directly. The latter regressor is uncorrelated with the subset of best PART
scores with one notable exception. The ﬁrst set of PART scores was notably lower than other years. In these models, we
exclude the programs assessed in the ﬁrst year (2002).
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Table 3
Federal Program PART Score by Appointees Associated w/Campaign
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Appointment Authority
Appointee (0,1) 24.75** (1.96) 26.74** (2.34) 23.63* (2.01) 24.59* (2.38)
Appointee associated with
campaign in press (0,1)
21.15 (1.66) 20.30 (1.85) 28.53** (3.32) 28.14** (3.63)
Program Characteristics
Ln(Program Budget) 1.18** (0.31) 0.56 (0.39) 0.91** (0.36) 0.11 (0.46)
Block/Formula Grant (0,1) 25.91** (2.96) 25.97 (3.69) 26.21* (3.31) 28.00** (4.01)
Capital Assets and Service
Acquisition (0,1)
2.99 (3.16) 2.60 (4.16) 3.25 (3.49) 0.03 (4.59)
Competitive Grant (0,1) 22.75 (2.73) 25.64 (3.50) 22.91 (3.04) 27.97** (3.76)
Credit (0,1) 0.81 (3.54) 0.45 (4.21) 2.56 (3.66) 21.09 (4.18)
Direct Federal (0,1) 1.54 (2.56) 3.52 (3.05) 0.37 (2.85) 0.71 (3.17)
Research and Development (0,1) 8.53** (2.70) 4.34 (3.90) 8.85** (3.02) 2.05 (4.22)
Bureau Characteristics
Fixed Term (0,1) 3.72 (3.43) 21.91 (5.03) 4.17 (3.17) 21.61 (4.72)
Commission (0,1) 5.62** (2.61) 3.10 (4.33) 5.47** (2.50) 2.34 (4.11)




2.26** (0.66) 3.65** (0.89) 2.23** (0.78) 3.85** (1.04)
Constant 58.63** (3.70) 61.06** (4.96) 60.94** (4.01) 66.28** (5.30)
Include Secretaries? Yes Yes No No
Only Most Effective PART
Scores?
No Yes No Yes
N 962 591 744 438
F(19, 942; 19, 571; 19, 693;
19, 387)
8.49** 6.13** 9.00** 7.07**
R2 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.22
Note: Unstandardized regression coefﬁcients and robust SEs reported. Omitted category for appointment authority is career member of the Senior Executive Service. Omitted category for program type is
regulatory programs. Year assessed indicator estimates omitted.




reject the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcient estimates in the simple OLS regression were
the same as those in the two-stage least squares.21
Although there were notable differences in education between appointees from
the campaign and other managers, education was estimated to have mixed effects on per-
formance. Although three of four coefﬁcients were in the expected direction, in one case
having a master’s level education was estimated to decrease a program’s PART score rel-
ative to managers with only a BA or high school education. Programs administered by
persons with doctorates were estimated to get PART scores 3.69 points higher than other
programs. One explanation for the mixed results is that only the very most talented people
from the set of employees with low levels of education make it into management positions.
This would dampen the inﬂuence of master’s level education on performance. Managers
with a master’s level of education may be able to get management positions without the
same type of screening mechanism that applies to those without degrees.
The estimates for coefﬁcients on previous work in the White House or in Congress are
negative in all cases, and the coefﬁcient on work for the White House is signiﬁcant and
large in the second model. Programs administered by appointees with previous work in the
White House are estimated to earn PART scores 8.44 points lower than other programs.
This result suggests that patronage-type appointees may be more attentive to political con-
cerns or patrons than management in their agency. If they are focused more on advancing
their careers or the interests of the party or patrons, management in their agency may suffer.
The results suggest that the skills required to do the political work of the White House do
not directly translate to federal program management.
An alternative explanation is that presidents may prefer to send appointees from the
White House to run programs with low PART scores to improve their performance. We
cannot rule out this possibility, particularly since we know anecdotally that Margaret Spell-
ings left the White House to run the Department of Education, a department with very low
PART scores. That said, the President also asked Condoleezza Rice to head the State De-
partment, an agency with signiﬁcantly higher overall evaluations. Indeed, if presidents are
concerned about poor performance, loyalty is important but so is competence. Presidents
need appointees who know how to effectively run a government agency to turn poor-
performing programs around. Given these facts, it is unlikely that patronage-type appoint-
ees are selected to run the poorest performing programs to improve their performance.
Interestingly, and contrary to previous work, we could not reject the null that previous
agency experience had no inﬂuence on PART score (Lewis 2008). Previous management
experience in either the private or public sector was also negatively correlated with PART
scores in the two models. There are a couple of possible explanations for these ﬁndings.
First, almost all managers in the sample had previous public management experience which
suggests the measures of agency or management experience do not adequately parse out
different types and levels of public management experience. Indeed, those managers with
greater tenure in their agency management positions (i.e., public management experience)
earned signiﬁcantly higher PART scores, which suggests that such experience helps. The
lack of variation in the public management variable also means that the few cases without
public management experience exert tremendous leverage in model estimation, and these
cases may not be representative of the overall population of managers. The results
21 See Appendix 3 for these estimates.
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regarding private management experience are consistent with some past research which
suggests that private management experience does not necessarily translate in the public
sector and inconsistent with other research which suggests it is helpful (see, e.g., Lewis
2008; Oh and Lewis 2008). Differences in management environment may help explain
why private sector management experience helps in some cases like the Defense Depart-
ment (Oh and Lewis 2008) and not in others.
DISCUSSION
There are two key ﬁndings in the empirical analysis of the PART scores. First, programs run
by political appointees perform worse on average than programs run by career managers.
Second, among programs administered by appointees, those run by appointees from the
campaign or party received the lowest scores. These results are robust to speciﬁcations
including controls for a host of agency or program speciﬁc factors.
Given the controversy of the PART scores themselves, it is worth considering whether
observed differences in PART scores are meaningful (Gilmour 2006; Metzenbaum 2009;
Moynihan 2006, 2008; Posner and Fantone 2007; Radin 2005; US Government
Accountability Ofﬁce 2004, 2005, 2008). That is, do the differences in PART scores mea-
sure real differences in program performance, and, thus, managerial performance? If the
PART scores are ﬂawed by factors such as uneven application, problems in rating, uneven
Table 4






Bureau Experience (0,1) 20.56 (1.33) 21.51 (1.88)
Months Serving as Bureau Chief (0 to 182) 0.71** (0.28) 0.67* (0.37)
Previous Public Management Experience (0,1) 24.68 (3.40) 27.02* (4.05)
Masters (0,1) 1.49 (1.43) 23.34* (1.78)
Doctorate (0,1) 3.69** (1.85) 4.12* (2.45)
Worked in Another Department (0,1) 0.99 (1.23) 1.53 (1.76)
Private Management Experience (0,1) 24.33** (1.30) 25.40** (1.93)
Worked in White House (0,1) 22.27 (2.52) 28.44** (2.96)
Worked in Congress (0,1) 22.96* (1.71) 22.82 (2.44)
Bureau Characteristics
Fixed Term (0,1) 3.22 (3.21) 1.47 (4.24)
Commission (0,1) 4.57* (2.76) 2.36 (5.13)
# Programs Evaluated 0.16 (0.17) 0.44* (0.24)
Political and Program Characteristics
Agency Ideology (Liberal2Conservative) 2.61** (0.66) 4.50** (0.93)
Ln(Program Budget) 1.45** (0.33) 0.82* (0.42)
Constant 70.57** (4.44) 75.60** (5.48)
N(Observations, Managers) 878 531
F(25, 282; 25, 49) 8.42** 6.40**
R2 0.19 0.23
Note: Unstandardized regression coefﬁcients and robust SEs reported. Program type and year assessed indicator estimates omitted.
*Signiﬁcant at the .10 level; **signiﬁcant at the .05 level in two-tailed test.
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resources for assessment, then the scores arguably should be noisy, uncorrelated with much
of anything of theoretical interest. Random problems emerging in PART scores should
confound any analysis of the scores, resulting in imprecise and inconsistent estimates
across models. Yet, predictable patterns emerge in the scores across program types and
agencies.
What is the source of these regularities? Is it systematic bias working its way into the
scores in ways that are confounded with key variables of interest? This is possible but a few
aspects of this analysis give us conﬁdence that differences in PART scores reﬂect real
differences in performance. First, the analysis accounted for a host of agency and
program-speciﬁc factors. For example, the analysis accounted for the most visible form
of ideological bias in the scores. One of the most persistent critiques of PART is that
the scores are politicized. However, if ideology is properly accounted for in model esti-
mation, observed differences in PART scores can be meaningful. Second, we examined
only those PART scores that career executives report as being the most valid and the results
remain. Overall, career executives were not sanguine about the validity of the PART scores.
This makes drawing inferences about real performance difﬁcult, but career executives
thought PART scores were more credible in some agencies than others. Presumably, if
career professionals believe the PART scores reﬂect real differences among programs
in their agencies, they contain meaningful performance information and the systematic
differences between appointees from the campaign and other executives derive from differ-
ences in management performance.
A second possible concern is that appointees from the campaign or party were less con-
cerned about PART scores than other appointees (or career executives) and this explains the
observedperformancegap.Althoughpossible, this is unlikely sincePARTwas ahighpriority
for the administration and presumably particularly so for the appointees most loyal to the
president suchas those fromthecampaign.Theanalysesabovealsoevaluate thePARTscores
judgedbest bycareer executives and therebyeliminatePARTscores that areunreliabledue to
a lack of effort. In addition, if theBushAdministration sought tomanipulate PARTscores for
its own beneﬁt, one would expect them to inﬂate the scores of programs run by appointees,
particularly those from the campaign, rather than programs run by careerists. If the BushAd-
ministrationmanipulatedPARTscoresinthisway, thenthedifferencesweseeinPARTscores
actually underestimate the true differences in program performance.
A ﬁnal concern is that appointees most concerned with change management would
earn the lowest PART scores. The disruption caused by trying to change a program’s di-
rection would result in lower PART scores. This is unlikely, however, since effective means
for implementing change are measured in the ﬁrst three portions of the PART worksheet.
For example, the PART evaluates the clarity of program purpose and mission, the use of
long term goals connected to the program mission, strategic planning, and the adequacy of
performance measures. Managers bringing change need to clearly articulate a vision, con-
nect that vision to identiﬁable metrics, and develop a plan for reaching targets. Managers
effectively bringing change should arguably earn higher PART scores on at least three of
the four portions of the PART worksheet (program purpose and design, strategic planning,
and strategic management). When models were estimated on each section independently,
the results conﬁrm that programs administered by appointees from the campaign or party
earned signiﬁcantly lower scores.
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CONCLUSION
One of the charges raised by critics of Obama Administration appointments is that these
appointments will hinder US policymaking and management. (see, e.g. ‘‘Political patron-
age alive and well at the USTR’’ Entrepeneur (2009)) By contrast, some scholars argue that
the political skills that can come from experience working for the campaign or party are
necessary for any agency head (Maranto 2008). Appointed executives do political work
such as negotiating with state and local ofﬁcials and dealing with the media. Although
political skills are undoubtedly important, the evidence here suggests that appointees given
jobs partly due to campaign or party work perform worse on average than other appointees
and career managers. If persons are given jobs for reasons other than their ability to manage
a program or agency well, this decreases the chances they will succeed in that task. The
political skills and experience gained from work on the campaign or for the party do not
translate into effective governance or management. Presidents must sometimes trade-off
their desire for accountability with their concern for effective management (Edwards 2001;
Heclo 1977; Mackenzie 1981).
What then to make of the common sense belief that political skills are necessary for
agency management? One conclusion that can be drawn is that political skills must be
accompanied by proper experience and subject area expertise. Persons rewarded with
a job from the campaign or party, however, often do not have accompanying work expe-
rience or subject area expertise. The effect of patronage factors on management
performance might also be smaller in the context of fewer appointees. The United States
has signiﬁcantly more political appointments than other developed democracies by a sig-
niﬁcant amount. The White House is involved in the selection of 3,000–4,000 persons to
policy or conﬁdential positions throughout the government (Lewis 2008; Patterson and
Pﬁffner 2001). Some existing research suggests that agencies perform best when there
is an appropriate mix of appointees and career professionals (see, e.g., Dunn 1997; Golden
2000; Krause, Lewis, and Douglas 2006). Working in teams, appointees, and careerists can
take advantage of the different skills they bring to management and work productively
together. Reducing appointees might help agencies ﬁnd the right balance between appoint-
ees and careerists that will improve performance.
Given the effect of patronage appointees on performance, it is worth asking why
presidents appoint such persons to administration jobs. The obvious answer is that there
is political beneﬁt to doing so. Beyond that, however, presidents and their personnel
ofﬁcials try and place people into jobs for which they are qualiﬁed and where they can
do the least damage to the president’s agenda (Lewis 2009). Indeed, the data suggest that
very few of the persons from the campaign or party were placed into positions where they
were directly managing federal programs. Those few that were placed into such jobs,
however, did perform worse than other appointees. The persistence of large numbers of
positions, particularly at the program management level, increases the chances that
someone with few qualiﬁcations will be named to a key management position. Although
presidents prefer to place such persons in positions where they can do the least damage to
their public agenda, this is not always possible as the example of Michael Brown at FEMA
illustrates.
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APPENDIX 1
Federal Program PART Score by Appointees from Campaign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Appointment Authority
Appointee (0,1) 25.72** (2.41) 27.82** (2.46) 20.36** (0.17) — 24.38 (6.30) 211.50** (4.10)
Appointee from campaign or national party (0,1) 25.00 (3.17) 24.22 (2.63) 20.57** (0.12) 26.84 (14.77) 24.97* (2.82) 29.58** (4.66)
Program Characteristics
Ln(Program Budget) 0.59 (0.53) 0.88** (0.40) 0.05** (0.02) 0.80* (0.45) 2.52** (0.72) 0.76 (0.74)
Block/Formula Grant (0,1) 21.25 (4.62) 24.73 (3.54) 20.31 (0.21) 21.06 (4.97) — —
Capital Assets and Service Acquisition (0,1) 3.70 (5.68) 2.98 (4.09) 20.01 (0.26) 7.96 (5.83) — —
Competitive Grant (0,1) 23.17 (4.52) 22.22 (3.47) 20.19 (0.20) 22.39 (6.30) — —
Credit (0,1) 20.38 (5.63) 2.53 (4.15) 20.07 (0.25) 3.35 (4.56) — —
Direct Federal (0,1) 1.70 (3.89) 3.32 (3.01) 0.17 (0.18) 5.87* (3.49) — —
Research and Development (0,1) 5.46 (5.54) 5.53 (3.75) 0.29 (0.23) 5.07 (4.62) — —
Bureau Characteristics
Fixed Term (0,1) 6.55 (4.72) 22.06 (5.77) 0.03 (0.32) 20.83 (5.76) — —
Commission (0,1) 10.75* (5.79) 5.11 (4.31) 0.53 (0.27) 2.34 (6.02) — —
# Programs Evaluated 22.96** (0.75) 0.31 (0.24) 0.04** (0.01) 0.33 (0.38) 0.35 (0.31) 22.24** (0.81)
Agency Ideology (Liberal-Conservative) 5.77** (1.22) 1.68 (1.53) 0.24** (0.06) 2.57** (0.91) 7.12 (7.27) 6.75** (3.20)
Constant 61.37** (5.19) 59.61** (4.89) — 58.83** (4.71) 56.34** (11.49) 73.53** (4.52)
N 331 591 591 505 155 190
F(19, 311; 27, 563; 13,194) 9.12** 8.08** — 78.83** 8.30** 5.39**
R2 0.32 0.27 — 0.15 0.11 0.16
Note: Unstandardized regression coefﬁcients and robust SEs reported. Omitted category is a regulatory program run by a career member of the SES. Year assessed indicator estimates omitted. All models
estimated with only most reliable PART scores. Model 1 excludes cases with no bureau listed on PART worksheet. Model 2 estimated with department ﬁxed effects (ﬁxed-effect estimates omitted). Model 3 is
an ordered probit model of program categorical grades (cut point estimates omitted). Model 4 includes two-stage least-squares estimates on a model estimated only on appointees. We could not reject null that
work for the campaign or party is exogenous (p, .83). Model 5 includes only liberal agencies and Model 6 includes only conservative agencies. Models 5 and 6 have spare speciﬁcations because of the limited
number of cases; estimating the full models would leave too few cases in cells including program type, year, and agency structure. Coefﬁcient estimates in models with full speciﬁcations look similar for Model 5
but in Model 6 the coefﬁcients are smaller and insigniﬁcant (Appointee [B(SE): 25.76 (4.09); Appointee from campaign or national party: 25.24 (4.14)]).






Finding exogenous regressors that predict whether a manager of a speciﬁc program is an
appointee or worked on the campaign but has no inﬂuence on PART scores is very
difﬁcult. To estimate these models, we examine only the most reliable PART scores.
These scores exhibit no statistically distinguishable time patterns except that the scores
are noticeably lower in 2002 (the ﬁrst year of the PART) than the other years. We exclude
programs assessed in 2002 from the models. The time component of the scores is important
since we rely on the natural dynamics of appointment politics as the exogenous regressors.
Speciﬁcally, we use indicators indicating that a ‘‘person’’ was hired right after an election
(0,1; i.e., 2001 or 2005), year of the president’s term in which the ‘‘program’’ was assessed
(1–4), and whether the program was assessed during the president’s second term (0,1) to
predict the probability that a program was administered by an appointee (rather than, e.g.,
a careerist in an acting capacity). In the ﬁrst case, the chances that a program was managed
by an appointee are predicted by the date of hire, but the date of hire should not directly
inﬂuence PART scores. In the second case, the chances that a program is run by an
appointee are higher or lower depending upon when in the president’s term the program
is assessed but when in a term a program is assessed should not inﬂuence the PART score.
Finally, during second terms, there are more potential patronage appointees to draw from
since there have been two campaigns. In the models estimated, we could not reject the null
APPENDIX 3
Federal Program PART Score by Manager Background (IV Estimates)
Most Effective Part Scores Only
Manager Background Characteristics
Bureau Experience (0,1) 22.60 (1.96)
Months Serving as Bureau Chief (0–182) 0.74* (0.42)
Previous Public Management Experience (0,1) 26.11 (4.13)
Masters (0,1) 23.22* (1.76)
Doctorate (0,1) 5.45** (2.46)
Worked in Another Department (0,1) 1.20 (1.76)
Private Management Experience (0,1) 25.26** (2.00)
Worked in White House (0,1) 27.87** (3.02)
Worked in Congress (0,1) 23.15 (2.44)
Bureau Characteristics
Fixed Term (0,1) 21.15 (4.37)
Commission (0,1) 2.58 (5.16)
# Programs Evaluated 0.21 (0.22)
Political and Program Characteristics
Agency Ideology (Liberal-Conservative) 3.47** (0.89)
Ln(Program Budget) 1.00** (0.41)
Constant 69.22** (4.89)
N(Observations, Managers) 500
F(25, 282; 25, 49) 142.39**
R2 0.21
Note: Unstandardized regression coefﬁcients and robust SEs reported. Program type and year assessed indicator estimates omitted. We
could not reject null that tenure is exogenous (p , .14).
**Signiﬁcant at the .05 level, *Signiﬁcant at the .10 level in two-tailed test.
240 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
that the coefﬁcients were the same using standard methods. Speciﬁcally, we estimated the
models with the ivregress command in STATA 10.0, followed by the estat endogenous
command.
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